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based on the interpretation of the text of the Constitution. The second phase of the 
Constitutional Court is analyzed by presenting decisions made in taxation cases and 
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The effect of contradictory relations of economic 
policy and government on the foundation and operation 
of the Constitutional Court prior to 2010
The evolvement of Hungarian constitutional justice after the change of regime in 
1990 was not without contradiction, and depended to a great extent on the frequent-
ly-changing direction of government, which significantly influenced its operation. 
Therefore, the foundation, further development and operation of the Constitutional 
Court depended significantly on the changes in political direction. These changes 
have had a significant effect on the foundation, operation and development of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court. Consequently, if we want to deal with the CC and its 
operation objectively, we cannot avoid presenting the evolution of the political trends 
influencing constitutional justice.
In the course of the change of regime in 1990, Hungary was largely insolvent in 
part as a result of the running of the MNB during the Kádár regime. At that time, the 
MNB’s management proposed that Hungary should join the International Monetary 
Fund (hereinafter, the IMF) at the end of the 1960s and it took out significant loans 
partly from the IMF and partly from foreign private banks, primarily West German 
financial institutions. The smaller part of these loans was used to maintain a higher 
level of living than that of the other Warsaw Pact countries. The reason for this was 
that the Kádár regime did not want a new uprising similar to the revolution of 1956. 
The larger part of the loans was invested in the modernization of state companies and 
in the renovation of their technology and stock if machinery.
At the time of the collapse of the real socialist system, Hungary seemed to have the 
opportunity to partially cancellation and reschedule its debts in a similar way to Po-
land. Hungary could have received this opportunity from Helmuth Kohl in gratitude 
for the opening of the Austrian–Hungarian border to East German citizens coming 
across Hungary, which advanced the process of German reunification. However, the 
first Hungarian prime minister after the change of regime, József Antall, did not take 
this opportunity saying that the opening of the borders was a humanitarian duty, for 
which it would be unethical to demand a reward. Besides the Hungarian Alliance 
of Free Democrats (in Hungarian ‘Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége’, hereinafter the 
SZDSZ), which at the time of the change of regime misled Hungarian voters with its 
anti-communist and anti-Soviet phraseology – threatened from the opposition side 
the first civilian government, which was made up of the coalition of the Hungari-
an Democratic Forum (in Hungarian ‘Magyar Demokrata Fórum’, hereinafter the 
MDF), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (in Hungarian ‘Kereszténydemokrata 
Néppárt’, hereinafter the KDNP) and the Smallholders’ Party. Acting aggressively and 
beyond its competence, the SZDSZ hindered all attempts to cancel or reschedule the 
debts. The scope for action of the Antall government was significantly limited by its 
agreement made with the SZDSZ under coercion. Based on this agreement, beside 
the conservative civilian government and its prime minister, József Antall, Parliament 
elected the liberal Árpád Göncz as President of the Republic, and György Surányi, 
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who had the same political orientation, as the head of the MNB. That behind all these 
steps stood the USA representing the global financial background power is supported 
by the fact that Mark Palmer, who was delegated to Hungary as the American ambas-
sador, directed the national privatization behind the scenes at the time of the change 
of the regime, thus taking part in the destruction of the Hungarian food, light, and 
engineering industries and in the transformation of Hungarian agriculture into the 
contract farm system similar to large farms in the USA. It was for this reason that they 
opposed the division of the cooperatives into family farms.
At the end of the 1980s the commercial banks, which previously operated as a de-
partment of the MNB, were torn away from the MNB and began to operate indepen-
dently under left-liberal control, providing preferential loans for the socialist political 
nomenclature in order to stabilize their existence in the economy, while these banks 
went bankrupt and needed to be capitalized by the state before their privatization. These 
processes should have been vetoed by the MNB, but this did not happen. The MNB, led 
by the liberal György Surányi, continued the previous liberal monetary policy. Therefore, 
József Antall replaced György Surányi in the autumn of 1991 and Péter Ákos Bod was 
elected for the position. However, he was forced to resign in 1994 by the first left-liberal 
government led by Gyula Horn as prime minister, and György Surányi was elected again 
as the president of the MNB. In the course of his presidency, the pyramid-scheme-like 
bond issues of the broker firm established by the K&H Bank were brought to light. These 
bond issues helped the enrichment of many left-liberal politicians and civil servants. All 
this went unnoticed by the MNB led by György Surányi, though the MNB should have 
noticed it since it had responsibility for monetary supervision. Presumably, the MNB 
discovered these illegal acts, however it probably disregarded them, because the MNB 
itself operated a branch in Vienna illegally and at great loss. During this period, Hun-
garian public debt did not decrease but stagnated. Significant damage and economic 
disadvantages were caused, however, by the fact that in the course of the Gyula Horn’s 
premiership, the corrupt, unconditional, and under-priced privatization practice con-
tinued, which was characteristic of the previous Antall government too. Moreover, it was 
Gyula Horn’s government which handed over the country’s energy resources and energy 
suppliers cheaply to foreign firms and placed the country, including its inhabitants and 
small and mid-sized enterprises into dependence on foreign multinationals.
In the spring of 1998, the first government led by Viktor Orbán, officially the sec-
ond civilian conservative coalition made up of the Alliance of Young Democrats (in 
Hungarian ‘Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége’, hereinafter Fidesz), KDNP and the Small-
holders’ Party, followed the Horn government. Thanks to the professional economic 
and financial cooperation between the first Orbán government and the MNB, direct-
ed by Zsigmond Járai, the country’s debts fell below 55 per cent (Gazdag, 2015:34).
After the parliamentary election of 2002, the first Orbán government was replaced 
by the second left-liberal government. In its first period, the state debt increased 
slightly (up to 59 per cent) (Gazdag, 2015:34) driven by the government, led at this 
time by Péter Medgyessy as its first prime minister, significantly raising the remunera-
tion of civil and public servants, which stimulated the economy and consumption. 
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However, it overstepped its financial possibilities, and the increased salaries could not 
be withdrawn. Consequently, collective dismissals, which breached both EU and Hun-
garian law, were launched at the institutions of civil and public servants (Prugberger, 
2005:34–36). The civil and public servants who took legal actions won on the first 
instance. However, on the second instance they lost because of the ‘directive’ given to 
the lower level courts by the Supreme Court, clearly under government pressure. The 
applications for review were rejected, of course, and in the same ‘odd way’ the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights did not find any infringement of law in the procedures 
of the Hungarian courts, either.1 It is a pity that no opposition party or individual filed 
a case to the Constitutional Court before the decision of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, because all the above-mentioned decisions and the government pressure 
on the courts violated the right to work and the judicial independence laid down in 
the previous Constitution, as well as warranty rights.
Not long after this, Péter Medgyessy was relieved in a putsch of his position as prime 
minister by wish of the SZDSZ coalition partner (Csontos, 2016:10). The constitutional 
nature of this event qualified as a borderline case according to statutes of the Consti-
tution2 that had been modified several times after the change of regime in 1990 and 
which preceded the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. That is to say, it was not a putsch 
coming outside with the aim of bring downing the political system, but rather an inner 
putsch, which did not affect the governmental authorization of the parties in power. 
Therefore, the opposition parties did not start constitutional proceedings. The afore-
mentioned broker firm of K&H Bank, in which the Hungarian Socialist Party (in Hun-
garian ‘Magyar Szocialista Párt hereinafter the MSZP) held an interest, and the Ministry 
of Youth and Sports led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, who followed Medgyessy as prime minis-
ter, and the ministries under SZDSZ control led the way in wasting public money and 
corruption (Prugberger, 2009:7–14). However, because these illegal, anti-public and 
anti-private property activities were carried out by those left-liberals in power by evading 
the regulations then in force but not violating the rules of the Constitution, no constitu-
tional proceedings were launched. Similarly, no constitutional procedures began in the 
“oil bleaching” cases, which happened at the same time and which were committed by 
the corrupt field-officers of the army, causing damage to the Hungarian state by tax eva-
sion. The then opposition took these cases before a parliamentary committee in vain, 
the committee members of the left-liberal government making it impossible to start 
investigations in these cases by their boycott (Prugberger, 2009:7–14).
The government of the left-liberal coalition led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, which gained 
a mandate for another four-year period at the elections in the spring of 2006, practi-
cally handled the country as a business and trade company. There was a peak in cor-
ruption and in the privatization of the country at a very low price. The national wealth 
decreased dramatically under the left-liberal comprador government unconditionally 
serving transatlantic capital and the economic goals of a USA bent on dominating the 
world. The state debt, which had decreased to below 55 per cent under the Orbán 
government, increased to more than 85 per cent during the Gyurcsány era as a result 
of the corrupt privatization and attempts at privatization (Prugberger, 2009:7–14), 
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and the dilettante macro-economic and monetary policy. The state budget deficit, 
which was expected by the EU to be under 3 per cent, increased to above 8 per cent. 
Pursuant to the Constitution prior to the Fundamental Law, constitutional proceed-
ings could not be launched due to unconstitutional governmental management be-
cause the constitutional rules prescribing rational management of public finances 
were first defined by the Fundamental Law which was enacted in 2011.
That is why the country reached a state of near bankruptcy similar to that of 
Greece. Gyurcsány had to resign as a consequence of the referendum rejecting the 
privatization of the state health insurance funds and the state health insurance (Prug-
berger, 2014:14). The ‘expert government’ – as it called itself – led by prime minister 
Gordon Bajnai, who followed Gyurcsány, ‘saved’ the country from the bankruptcy 
by taking out IMF loans with tough conditions, the aim of which was to maintain the 
country’s neoliberal transatlantic dependence by requiring high interest and short 
loan periods, which would have caused the country to take out further loans. Sadly, 
the Constitutional Court again failed to declare the short-lived Act No. 1 of 2001 on 
Private Health Insurance Funds unconstitutional in relation to the privatization plan 
of the Gyurcsány government based on its infringement of the right to health guaran-
teed by the Constitution. In this case the Bajnai government would not have been able 
to pass its act aiming at a similar establishment of the private pension funds, which 
was eventually annulled by the second Orbán government (Prugberger, 2014:18–19).
During this period, the Constitutional Court, founded in 1990, had two operation-
al profile phases. The first phase was characterized by the political and ideological atti-
tude of the founding members. The first president of the body, László Sólyom, as well 
as its vice-president and the great majority of the judges had a civil democratic and/or 
Christian democratic bias. Only a minority represented the moderate social-national 
reform-socialist view, the inner content of which was characterized by the human-
faced socialist world view. These two orientations could cooperate in the body. This 
first body of the Constitutional Court, led by László Sólyom, elaborated the concept of 
the administration of constitutional justice based on the “invisible constitution”. For, 
although the Constitution of 1949 was completely modified and amended in 1984, it 
still had the atmosphere of the Stalin-Rákosi dictatorship. And there had been no new 
constitution as a result of the constant refusal of the constitution drafts of the govern-
ments in power after the change of regime by the representatives of the opposition 
at the time. The concept and standards of the invisible constitution were formed as a 
synthesis derived from Magna Carta, the written constitutions of Western European 
countries, and the constitution of the USA.3 All this was latently influenced by the 
historical doctrine of the Holy Crown, and the agreement, incorporated in a “Magna 
Carta”, concluded between the Hungarian king Andrew II and the Hungarian estates, 
and the invisible constitution was based on these documents. This approach resulted 
in the decision of the Constitutional Court, which deemed the Act No. LXXV of 1995 
on the Ownership, Use and Sale of Agricultural Land not to be unconstitutional.4
According to the declarations of the first constitutional judges, the Constitutional 
Court – by means of its decisions – tried to “lay down the basis for the change of 
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regime” during its first period before the years of 2010–2012 (Sólyom, 2001). For 
this reason and in order to be able to annul with “ex nunc” effect all the regulations 
which were not in compliance with the Constitution amended significantly by Act No. 
I of 1989, Act No. XXXII of 1969 on the constitutional court offered a great variety 
of means for the control of norms, many of which the Constitutional Court could 
not take advantage of due to the large number of constitutional complaints made by 
individuals. In the first decades, the Constitutional Court was greatly overloaded by 
petitions from advocates and individuals who tried to repair their own or their clients’ 
injuries to interest shrouded in a breach of the constitution. There were many actio 
popularis among them, too. Besides this, in this period and later too, the Constitution-
al Court had to handle the lack of political consensus and the shortcomings in legal 
techniques in the cases of petitions of interest organizations and the then opposition 
parties (Sólyom, 2001). For this reason, the Constitutional Court could not declare 
unconstitutionality in many cases where the legal acts and the principles behind them 
were formally in compliance with the Constitution, but where the politics, and the 
civil servants and politicians serving that politics, committed abuses in their ad hoc 
political decisions that were concealed by legal reasoning. This revealed itself first of 
all in the field of privatization (Prugberger, 1997). The normative and ad hoc deci-
sions were often influenced by the politics and the duality, i.e. the norms which were 
the subjects of the Constitutional Court decisions seemed to be in compliance with 
the Constitution on the basis of strict objectivity, however, they seemed to be contra-
dictory to EU law or the prevailing political interests or vice versa. All this resulted in 
many controversial or debated Constitutional Court decisions.
The case of the Zétény–Takács Act on Justice5 was a typical example for the above 
written. The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutionality in a constrained way 
in the constitutional control petition of Árpád Göncz referring to the infringement of 
legal certainty. The same happened in the case of the Zétényi–Csurka–Zimányi bill6, 
which had eliminated the constitutional shortcomings of the previous act in vain. 
Both the act and the bill attempted to discontinue the lapse in the cases of political 
miscarriages of justice, liquidations and capital treason between 1944 and 1999 and 
based on these, the perpetrators of the aforementioned crimes committed during 
World War II and between 1944 and 1990 could have been held responsible as the 
protection of the dictatorial regime had slipped away (Zétényi, 1999). Regarding the 
highly controversial foreign privatizations, which were contrary to the interests of the 
Hungarian state, the Constitutional Court could not intervene effectively, because 
before the privatizations the left-liberal Horn government made the previously non-
transferrable state property transferrable by amendments to the Constitution and 
other acts on state property and its protection.7
The second phase of the operation of the Constitutional Court before the second 
Orbán government was characterized by the lack of the previous trend of public le-
gal theory due to the chairmanship of János Németh, a legal professor in civil pro-
cedure. Consequently, the Constitutional Court started a practise of analysing case 
law, in which the normative or ad hoc legal norm that was the subject of the petition 
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or complaint was compared to the relevant constitutional provision, the rights and 
obligations prescribed by it and it was analyzed in detail as to what extent the legal 
norm in question was in compliance with or contrary to them. This practice was also 
followed by the next constitutional chairs and judges.8 The present administration of 
constitutional law is not far from this point of view and practice with the difference 
that judges compare the contested normative or ad hoc action to the new Fundamen-
tal Law taking effect in 2011 instead of the repealed Constitution of 1949 which had 
been comprehensively amended many times.
By the second phase of the Constitutional Court’s operation prior to 2010, the 
cases which could be sent to the Court had been restricted. Despite that, there were 
left-liberal expectations of influencing the objective decision making, which the Con-
stitutional Court could more or less successfully fight against. This tendency mani-
fested itself in connection with the aforementioned privatization cases, where – as was 
mentioned before – the government had amended the law, or had the law amended 
by Parliament to be in compliance with EU law preferring free market competition 
and with the Constitution having been amended comprehensively in 1989. Even the 
courts declared many privatizations and other contracts as injuring public interest 
and violating good morality based on the principle of freedom of contracting. Typi-
cal examples of this were the cases where huge amounts of severance pay were given 
to left-liberal public and civil servants in leading positions at public institutions with 
reference to the termination of their employment by mutual consent, whereas they 
continued to be employed in their previous positions in a contract of agency or com-
mercial legal relationship (Prugberger, 2009:7–14; 2010:79–80).
The temporary period after 2010 and the new period 
starting in 2012 with the going into effect  
of the New Fundamental Law and the New Act  
on the Constitutional Court
On the basis of what is mentioned above, the third Fidesz–KDNP civil coalition and 
the second Orbán government that took office in 2010 faced huge corruption cases 
and abuses (Prugberger, 2010:79–81). At first, the government attempted to have the 
aforementioned severance payments paid back into the state and local government 
budgets by means of court decisions. The courts, with their mainly left or left-liberal at-
titude biases, rejected to declare these contracts invalid on the basis of being illicit and, 
moreover, and rather controversially, they declared them valid based on the principle 
of the freedom of contracting. As a response and in order to return the money to the 
state budget, the new civil government levied a 98 per cent tax on such remunerations 
with retrospective effect by amending the Taxation Act. However, because of this, the 
government officials whose contracts had been unlawfully terminated by the Medgyessy, 
Gyurcsány and Bajnai governments and who were lawfully entitled to compensation for 
damages were also negatively affected. This modification of the act came before the 
Constitutional Court, which annulled it by referring to the principle that nobody can 
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retrospectively be put in a legally more disadvantageous situation.9 The Fidesz–KDNP 
government, thinking that a lot of the judges over a certain age had been socialized 
under the Kádár regime and therefore had a left-liberal attitude and were loyal to that 
political view, made amendments to acts stating that although the majority of civil serv-
ants could stay in office until the age of 70, judges can work only until the age of 62 
and at that time they must retire. This special legal provision was also annulled by the 
Constitutional Court because of the infringement of the principle of equal treatment.10
As far as other officials are concerned, the government provided special treatment 
for government officials by creating the Government Officials Act (in Hungarian 
‘kormánytisztviselői törvény’, hereinafter the Ktjt11) giving them a special legal status, 
but also placing them under strong subordination and requiring unconditional loyalty 
from them towards the government. Therefore, the Ktjt prescribed that government 
officials are required to be loyal to their direct superiors, and if they do not work to 
the expectations of the government or their superiors, then their public service can 
be terminated at any time without reason. Since the provision of Ktjt allowing the 
termination of employment without reason infringes Article 24 of the Social Charter 
– which states that all notices delivered by the employer must contain valid reasons – 
and since the termination of employment by the employer without reason results in 
the infringement of the right to work, the Constitutional Court annulled the provision 
of the Ktjt allowing termination without reason.12 The new Civil Servants Act (herein-
after referred to as Kttv13) already prescribes the obligation to provide valid reasons 
for the notice of termination of the civil servant’s employment in a similar way to the 
Labour Code Act14 and the Public Servants Act (hereinafter referred to as Kjt15), but 
the provision of the Kttv prescribing obligatory reasons for the termination of employ-
ment of both government officials and civil servants provides less protection than the 
Labour Code provides for employees or the Kjt for public servants. That is to say, both 
government officials and civil servants can be dismissed due to a lack of confidence, 
which is a reason that can be used anytime in any case, or a so-called “rubber reason”. 
Thus, government officials and civil servants have become very defenceless, especially 
in that sense that according to the Kttv, civil servants must be loyal to their superiors. 
Therefore, a talented civil servant is at the existential mercy of their mediocre superior. 
 These provisions in the Kttv, which provide a possibility for contra-selection, could 
be attacked before the Constitutional Court based on the fact that they violate the 
principle of equal treatment and entail negative discrimination towards civil servants 
compared to the provisions related to termination in the Labour Code and the Kjt 
(Mélypataki, 2011; 2013).16 
On the other hand, it must be seen as a positive fact that the Constitutional Court 
declared unconstitutionality – both before and after the Fundamental Law took effect 
in 2012 – both in the cases of notices of termination without reason and in the cases of 
complaints relating to the levying of taxes retrospectively.17 In these cases, the Consti-
tutional Court – as with the levying of the 98 per cent tax or the obligatory retirement 
of judges at the age of 62 – was right to question the constitutionality of the way the 
government handled these issues. 
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Even so, on the basis of what is described above, the government can be under-
stood, since it tried to reverse and eliminate as quickly as possible the corruption, 
moral-socio-political depravity, the tendency towards anarchy and the increasing fi-
nancial instability of public finances, which were the results of the previous 8 years of 
left-liberal government. Essentially, this was the reason for the negative response by 
the government in creating the act, in which the scope of power of the Constitutional 
Court was limited in economic cases. It is, however, in compliance with EU law, and 
this is reflected in the fact that the Supreme Court is allowed to examine only the 
validity of the reason given in the notice of termination by the employer, while exam-
ining the content of the reason falls outside of its scope.18 Despite the limitation, the 
Constitutional Court could declare unconstitutionality in cases affecting the econo-
my where there is an infringement of the Fundamental Law, without contravening 
economic political interests. The fact that the government enhanced its discretional 
power in this issue turned out subsequently to be correct because with its professional 
economic and financial policy in cooperation with the MNB, it was able pull the coun-
try out of the economic and financial mud into which the country was dragged by the 
previous 8-year left-liberal government and the MNB, which followed orthodox policy 
and was involved in offshore actions through its president at that time.
From this point of view, it is worth judging positively the present unorthodox eco-
nomic and monetary policy of the MNB, which was especially fiercely criticized by the 
left-liberal opposition in connection with its policy relating to foundations. Under 
pressure from the opposition, the President of the Republic filed a petition to the 
Constitutional Court against the bill on the legislation relating to foundations. The 
aim of endowing foundations was to promote the training of economic experts in 
unorthodox economic policy, as opposed to orthodox economic policy, within the 
framework of the MNB in such a way that it could not be disturbed by the aggres-
sive protest of the opposition, which favours mainstream orthodox economic political 
policy. In order to achieve this, the government wanted to amend Article 162 of Act 
No. CXXXIX of 2013 on the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) with Bill No. T/9380 
so that that knowledge of the data concerning the foundations and the economic 
enterprises established by the MNB to fulfil its tasks could be restricted. The reason 
for this given by the MNB and the government was that although it is a public asset, it 
comes from the profit of the MNB management and, therefore it is not part of public 
finances, and thus the supervision of its use and utilization is the responsibility of the 
Supervisory Board of the MNB. This view was considered a reason for concern by the 
impartial President of the Republic, therefore he turned to the Constitutional Court. 
In his opinion – which was accepted by Decision No. 8/2016 (IV.6.) of the Court – the 
companies owned by the MNB and the foundations established by it manage public 
funds. Pursuant to Article 39 of the Fundamental Law all the data concerning public 
funds are of public interest. Organizations managing public funds are obliged to give 
accounts of their management of public funds. However, the President of the Repub-
lic and the Constitutional Court also acknowledged the fact, which was also part of 
the reasoning of the aforementioned Decision of the Court, that it is legal to restrict 
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the publicity of such data in the interest of the protection of any constitutional value 
or fundamental right. Despite this, the Constitutional Court declared the bill to be 
unconstitutional in its above-mentioned decision. Considering all this, there is some 
inconsistency in the decision of the Constitutional Court, which is also reflected in 
the two minority reports attached to the Decision. According to Béla Pokol’s minority 
report, the separation of the economic enterprises established by the MNB from its 
foundations would be justified, a view which partly coincides with that of the MNB 
and the government. In his minority report, András Zs. Varga emphasizes that the 
Fundamental Law does not contain procedural rules relating to the knowledge of 
data of public interest. Nevertheless, the provision of the Act on the Central Bank of 
Hungary may be interpreted in a way that data may be requested from the decision-
making organization.19 Since the opposition, being committed to left-liberal orthodox 
policy, was not in favour of all this, they submitted their complaint to the Constitu-
tional Court asking the court to declare the unconstitutionality of all of the measures 
related to foundations of the MNB. The Constitutional Court, however, pointed out 
its constitutional doubts regarding only the qualification procedure for private foun-
dations and the attempt at confidentiality in connection with this, and not regarding 
the whole package of measures, which is correct from constitutional considerations 
and very important to the country from an economic point of view. It is very important 
because empty mainstream neoliberal economic conceptions, literature, “scientific” 
research and education are made from fiction rather than from mathematical deduc-
tions and formulas based on economic and sociological reality, and therefore they are 
useless. László Csaba, in his monograph about European economics (Csaba, 2014:26, 
55) and Csaba Lentner, in his essays on public funds (Lentner, 2015:31–76; 2016), 
give very strong and in-depth criticisms of that mainstream economic trend that leads 
to deadlock. Since this trend, which is empty but still maintains its power at any cost, 
can only be crushed by the MNB establishing – with the support of foundations – 
educational centres teaching economics within the framework of both the MNB and 
institutions of higher education, and where the teaching of unorthodox economic 
trends will prevail, the steps towards the separated management of foundations are 
legally justified too. European law, in line with the World Bank and the IMF, supports 
the independence of the MNB. And that is what Matolcsy legally took advantage of. 
Notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court – with the exceptions of the two minor-
ity reports – did not take this fact into consideration. From the view point of legal 
philosophy, the Constitutional Court approached the question from the traditional 
“correct law” side, and not from the now-prevailing aspect of positive law, which can 
be disputed from the point of view of correct law.
Regardless of this case, and besides the issues of economic policy and the existen-
tial questions affecting the civil service sector, the Constitutional Court has advanced 
the rights of its citizens to social security, health, a good environment and human 
dignity with many of its decisions.20
To conclude, we can state that the administration of Hungarian constitutional 
law may be divided into two different phases. In the first period of the first phase, 
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the decisions were based on a constitutional theoretical approach rather than on 
the interpretation of the statutes of the constitution, while in the second period of 
the first phase the Constitutional Court made its decisions based on the interpre-
tation of the statutory provisions of the Constitution. The decisions of the second 
phase were largely made on the basis of the new Fundamental Law. A significant 
proportion of the cases has involved labour and civil service status issues, provisions 
making citizens’ rights more burdensome retrospectively and the analysis of the 
management of financial and central bank foundations. All the phases of the ad-
ministration of Hungarian constitutional law may be characterized by the fact that 
it could not avoid being influenced by politics and this applies everywhere since 
the administration of constitutional law moves along the border of politics and law 
(Paczolai, 1995).
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and urging – that the Hungarian courts made their decisions, having become legally binding, in accord-
ance with the law.
2  Act No. XX of 1949 (not effective).
3  See also Sólyom, 2001 and the parallel opinion attached to No. 23/1990. (X.30.) CC. Decision.
4  35/1994 (VI.24.) CC. Decision.
5  11/1992 (III.5.) Constitutional Court Decision on the first justice bill (Zétényi–Takács).
6  53/1993 (X.13.) Constitutional Court Decision on the second justice bill (Zétényi–Csurka–Zimányi).
7  33/1993 (I.28.) Constitutional Court Decision and 21/1994 (III.16.) Constitutional Court Decisions 
were related to this.
8  This decision line is described in the detailed interpretation of the Constitutional Court decisions in 
connection with the social insurance by Rab, 2012:52–112.
9  37/2011. (V.10.) Constitutional Court Decision declared the provision of Act No. XC of 2010 which 
raised the income tax with a retrospective effect unconstitutional and 1268/B/2010 Constitutional 
Court Decision is about the constitutional control of the act after its modification as a consequence of 
the above-mentioned Constitutional Court Decision.
10  33/2012. (VII.17.) Constitutional Court Decision.
11  Act No. LVIII. of 2010 on the Status of Government Officials (Ktjt) (not effective).
12  8/2011. (II.18.) Constitutional Court Decision.
13  Act No. CXCIX of 2011 on the Legal Status of Civil servants (Kttv).
14  Act No. I. of 2012 on the Labour Code.
15  Act No. XXXIII of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public Servants (Kjt).
16  Important Constitutional Court Decisions in the cases of the terminations of civil servants’ employment: 
518/D/2009–518/D/ 2009 AB.; 111/B/2011-29/2011 AB; III. 00505/2012–342012 AB; III. 00506/2012. 
AB; IV. 01235/214–3049/2015 AB., IV. 01648/2014–3285/2014; IV. 00894/2015–3192/2015 AB.
17  Ibid.
18  Act CXIX of 2010 narrowed the circle of the financial acts in which the Constitutional Court may ex-
ecute constitutional control. See further Naszladi–Tilk, 2015.
19  8/2016. (IV.16.) CC. Decision declared unconstitutional – with the exceptions of the Minority Reports 
of Béla Pokol and András Zs. Varga – the modification of the Act on the Central Bank of Hungary which 
would have allowed confidentiality in case of the foundations of the MNB.
20  See, for example, No. 518/E/2006–38/20011. Constitutional Court Decision in capacity case – see fur-
ther its legal interpretation by Jakab, 2014:109–111, 220.
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